

1 **Authors response to two reviewers and comments of L.A. Smith**

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3 In the following we will respond to the major points given by two reviewers and L.A. Smith.
4 We first give their comments in italic, followed by our response.

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6 **Answers to major points of reviewer # 1 (Peter Thorne)**

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8 *I find the hook to pre-industrial tenuous given that the authors make no attempt to*
9 *estimate a true pre-industrial based value. They would be better, in my view, to state that*
10 *they are making an estimate relative to the late 19th Century / early global instrumental*
11 *record. This would be a fairer reflection of what is actually done and consistent with e.g.*
12 *IPCC AR5 which deliberately avoided in the published version implying that 1850-1900*
13 *constituted pre-industrial as noted in Hawkins et al. Indeed, the final plenary of the WGI*
14 *involved a long discussion that I was personally involved in around the topic whereby the*
15 *parties agreed that pre-industrial was earlier than 1850. It would be unwise, in my view, for*
16 *the authors to reopen this issue. I note in a couple of places that there are phrases which*
17 *could imply IPCC used 1850-1900 as pre-industrial, and they did not. Such implications*
18 *absolutely must be avoided outright in any resubmission.*

19
20 *The discussion linking their work to the pre-industrial era would be far better being given*
21 *exclusively in the Discussion section and, to my view, the authors should remove allusions to*
22 *providing an estimate relative to pre-industrial earlier than this. Bottom line: They either*
23 *should estimate relative to true-pre-industrial or be honest with respect to what they are*
24 *estimating relative to for the paper to be acceptable. As I see it there is no rigorous attempt*
25 *to estimate changes since pre-industrial. Rather, there is a rigorous attempt to estimate it*
26 *since 1880 which in itself is useful and valuable. The authors should be honest in this regard*
27 *and not oversell their work by claiming it's an estimate relative to pre-industrial when it*
28 *demonstrably is not.*

29
30 We agree with the reviewer and will adapt the text in the way he suggests. Our uncertainty
31 and sensitivity analysis is clearly relative to 1880, and not 1850, or relative to the period
32 1720-1800 (as in Hawkins et al. 2017), or even relative to the period 1400-1800 (as in Schurer
33 et al., July 24, 2017 - Nature Climate Change). The reason we choose for 1880, is (i) data
34 availability and (ii) the increasing uncertainties in GMT estimates for years earlier than 1880.
35 For example, the Hadley Centre estimates the GMT value plus uncertainty in 1900 to be -0.20
36 [-0.34, -0.06] °C (95% confidence limits). For 1850 the GMT estimate is
37 -0.37 [-0.59, -0.16] °C.

38
39 We propose to follow the comment to treat the role of 'pre-industrial' solely in the discussion.
40 We propose to add the results of Schurer et al. (2017) who analyze the role of GHGs, solar
41 radiation and volcanic dust from 1401 onwards. They find that GHGs had a significant effect
42 on global warming if the period 1401-1800 is compared to 1850-1900: from 0.02 to 0.20 °C
43 (5-95% confidence limits). If all forcings are combined (GHG, solar, volcanic) they find
44 0.09 [0.03 - 0.19] °C.

45
46
47 *I also find the Section at the end of the paper alluding to RCPs and end of Century to be out*
48 *of scope and a distraction. It should either form an integral part of the paper integrated*
49 *throughout or be dropped. Given journal scope I would lean heavily toward its removal. The*
50 *year 2100 is not in the past (at least yet)!*

51 Agreed. We propose to remove 'the future' in Section 5.2, including Figure 5.

52

53 *Finally, given the authors apparent desire to explore uncertainty I find the omission of the*
54 *JMA observational analysis and the NOAA 20CR product odd. I could see a case for omission*
55 *of 20CR, but I see no logical case why the JMA analysis should be omitted here as it has the*
56 *same non-peer-reviewed basis as e.g. the Berkeley global (not land, but global) estimate.*
57 *JMA uses a fundamentally distinct set of SSTs and so would better span uncertainty that the*
58 *authors lament in Section 2.1.*

59 We have studied the global series of the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA). There is a
60 simple practical problem, however: this series starts in 1891. Thus, we miss the important
61 period 1880-1890. Next to that, there are only texts in Japanese which explain how this data
62 product is composed. Finally, studies which show the JMA series are limited. Our choice for
63 five GMT data products as described in Section 2.1 is consistent with recent studies such as
64 Medhaug et al. (2017 - their figure 1a) or Rahmstorf et al. (2017 - their figures 1 and 2).
65 Therefore, we propose not to add trend analyses for JMA to Table 1.

66 As a test we estimated linear trends for all five data products shown in Table 1 and
67 additionally the JMA series. It appears that the JMA incremental value for the period
68 1891-2016 equals the low end of the five data products we apply in our Table 1 (i.e., the
69 incremental value of the HadCRUT4 series). Thus, the incremental value based on the JMA
70 series, does not fall outside the range of values based on HadCRUT4, NASA, NOAA,
71 HadCRUT4 adapted by Cowtan and Way, and BEST.

72 As for the NOAA 20CR series we have two arguments for not adding it to our study. First, the
73 20CR series covers the period 1851-2011. Thus, data for the important period 2012-2016 are
74 missing. Second, the series is a combination of modeling (weather prediction models) and
75 data. For our study we prefer to make a distinction between GMT series directly derived from
76 temperature registrations and models, be it GCMs or weather prediction models.

77

78 We propose to name these arguments in the first item of the discussion section.

79

80 *Minor comment #12. Line 202 you should clarify what the implications of ignoring this are or,*
81 *preferably, perform the extra work necessary for its inclusion. Presumably the impact would*
82 *be artificially reduced uncertainty ranges? In which case is it really safe to ignore this*
83 *issue? I'm not entirely convinced and would suggest that extra work leading to its*
84 *inclusion is instead warranted. Even if it ends up showing no change it would make*
85 *the piece more robust. As you yourselves state the effect is statistically significant, in*
86 *which case it really should be included.*

87

88 Agreed. We propose to show the effect on correcting for this small but significant AR(1)
89 correlation in the innovation series of our Kalman filter model.

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95 **Answers to major points of Anonymous Referee #2**

96

97 *This study considers the question of estimating by how much global temperatures have*
98 *changed since 'pre-industrial' times, assessing the uncertainty in different trend models*
99 *and due to different global temperature datasets. The analysis is interesting, though*
100 *the results are not too surprising. However, I have some major concerns:*

101

102 *1) Framing: the authors emphasize repeatedly that they are estimating changes since*
103 *a particular baseline and implying that this is what the Paris agreement meant by*
104 *'preindustrial'.*

105

106 *This is not the case - the introduction of Hawkins et al. (which the authors*
107 *cite) discusses this issue at length. In addition, Schurer et al. (2017, NCC) was very*
108 *recently published, highlighting again that there was likely some additional warming*
109 *due to anthropogenic factors before 1850. The authors may also like to examine Otto*
110 *et al. (2015) for an alternative approach to estimating the warming since the 19th century.*
111 *The text in the discussion on this topic is appropriate however.*

112 Agreed. We propose to treat the topic of 'pre-industrial' more clearly in the discussion section,
113 as we pointed out in our response to Reviewer #1. We will add the references to Schurer et al.
114 (2017) and Otto et al. (2015). Consequently, we will address their findings that GHGs had a
115 significant effect on global warming if the period 1401-1800 is compared to 1850-1900: from
116 0.02 to 0.20 °C (5-95% confidence limits). If all forcings are combined (GHG, solar, volcanic)
117 they find 0.09 [0.03 - 0.19] °C.

118

119 *2) Terminology: some of the phrasing is very confusing when referring to and/or*
120 *distinguishing between natural *forced* variability (volcanic, solar) and internal *unforced**
121 *variability. These terms are sometimes mixed and it's not always clear what the authors*
122 *mean. For example, in the abstract (and L86) the authors claim the models are*
123 *corrected for natural variability, when they mean the forced component, but the introduction*
124 *uses natural variability to mean both forced and unforced variations. On L133,*
125 *the authors refer to the 'historicalNat' runs 'for natural unforced variability', which is not*
126 *true - those runs include both natural forced and internal unforced variations as the*
127 *next sentence correctly states. Variability is also used for the spread or range between*
128 *different estimates, adding further confusion. The authors should carefully check each*
129 *use of this type of phrasing and make it far more precise.*

130

131 Agreed. We propose to check the phrasing of 'natural variability' carefully, this in
132 combination with the terms 'forced' or 'unforced' or both, 'internal variability' and 'spread'.

133

134 Additionally, we propose to treat the role of natural unforced variability and natural forced
135 variability (i.e., the role of changes in irradiance of the sun and changes in volcanic activity)
136 separately in a second item in the discussion section.

137


138 The trend analyses as given in our Table 1 are based on the IPCC definition of climate change
139 (Glossary AR5): anthropogenic forcing combined with decadal to centennial natural
140 variability. However, UNFCCC defines climate change as originating from GHG forcing
141 only. In their philosophy we could argue that the Paris limits of 1.5 and 2.0 C should originate
142 solely from anthropogenic forcing. We propose to quantify this second view on the Paris
143 limits.

144 To do so we make use of the recent study of Schurer et al. (2017, their figures S2 and S3), and
145 the lower panel of figure 4 in our manuscript. Next to that we estimated the role of volcanos
146 in a time-series setting by extending the Integrated Random Walk (IRW) model. For details
147 we will refer to Visser and Molenaar (1995) and Visser et al. (2015).

148
149 It shows that the incremental values shown in Table 1 for the IRW trend are 0.04 °C degree
150 lower. If estimated in combination with the OLS straight line, i.e. a regression model with one
151 explanatory variable, estimates are 0.02 °C lower than those shown in table 1. This effect,
152 although small, will be due to the Krakatoa eruption in the period 1880-1890.

153
154 The indicator for volcanic dust is taken from NASA: aerosol optical depth (AOD). See graph
155 below:

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157



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160 3) GCM analysis: the 106 members used cannot be 'one per model' as there were not
161 that many models in CMIP5. It's not clear what the authors have used here - there must
162 be more than one historical part of the runs for some of the models.

163
164 The reviewer addresses a good point. What we meant here is that we used one member per
165 model, **given the use of a specific RCP scenario**. Thus, we have used 42 members for
166 emission scenario RCP4.5, 25 members for emission scenario RCP6.0 and 39 members for
167 emission scenario 8.5, making up a total of 106 members. We propose to clarify this in the
168 text.

169
170 *There are also 43 piControls on Climate Explorer, and very few are less than 200 years, not*
171 *only the 20 that the authors have used - why have they not used the others?*

172
173 Agreed. We have calculated all AR(1) coefficients for all 41 piControl runs, available in the
174 KNMI Climate Explorer. Three of those runs showed a jump or a strong linear trend over the
175 simulation period (varying from 200 to 1000 years). We omitted these. For the remaining 38
176 runs we have omitted the lowest two AR(1) coefficient estimates (lying around 0.0) and the

177 two highest estimates (lying around 0.75). The remaining range equals the range given in our
178 manuscript: [0.28 - 0.60]. We propose to adapt the text for this finding.

179

180 *Also, in section 3.2, the authors could use the AR(1) value from each model's own control run*
181 *to fit a spline to the historical run of that same model, rather than assume the same across*
182 *every model. Also, how has the correction for natural forcings been applied (L250)? Has*
183 *the mean across the historicalNat runs been subtracted from each historical run? If*
184 *so, this is inconsistent as the response to volcanic eruptions varies significantly across*
185 *models.*

186

187 In our revision we propose to give values for smoothing by splines with $\phi=0.28$ and $\phi=0.60$,
188 similar to shown in our figure 3. Period: 1861-2016. This gives a small change in the upper
189 panel of our figure 4. The spread is for both smoothing options identical ± 0.50 C (2σ). The
190 mean value of all 106 increments is 1.15 for the smoothing option with $\phi=0.28$ and 1.00 for
191 $\phi=0.60$.

192

193

194 **Answers to major points of L.A. Smith**

195

196 *Visser et al (2017) provide an interesting and insightful discussion of signal detection in*
197 *global mean temperature (GMT), focusing on the 1.5 degree target of the Paris Agreement*
198 *of 2015. This paper could be made more informative by further consideration of three topics:*
199 *(1) clarifying what is meant by "signal" and by "noise", and more specifically how (whether)*
200 *natural variability can be "corrected for" in an evolving nonlinear system, (2) implications of*
201 *using CMIP5 models, given that those models display a wide range of values for today's*
202 *GMT, and (c) a cleaner definition of how one would detect failure to stay "well below" a*
203 *temperature target, or to exceed it. These points are expanded upon below.*

204

205 **Specific Comments**

206 *"Natural variability" is said to be a dominant source of uncertainty which has been*
207 *"corrected for" (24). Although discussions of a climate signal coming "out of the noise" are*
208 *common, the notions underlying the distinction between signal and noise in the climate*
209 *context is unclear; it is not the traditional distinction of observational noise superimposed*
210 *on a imprecisely measured but well-defined signal. Superposition can only be assumed in*
211 *nonlinear systems given purely observational noise that has no impact on the system: natural*
212 *variability, internal variability and the like alter the dynamics, and thus the "signal" itself, if*
213 *such a separation exists (Smith (2001,2002)). A more appropriate conceptualization in*
214 *nonlinear systems is found in consideration of an ensemble of systems each subject to a*
215 *common driving and independent realizations of the relevant noise. In this case, the ensemble*
216 *median would provide a well-defined signal while the distribution about it would capture the*
217 *effects of noise processes. This view is of limited utility in climate science, where there is only*
218 *one realization (the Earth): particular realizations need not reflect the (unobservable, non-*
219 *empirical) "signal"; indeed they can diverge arbitrarily far from it. So in no sense can one*
220 *expect "the" signal to emerge from the noise, given observations of a single realization.*
221 *While vague appeals to something somewhat reminiscent of an adiabatic change in*
222 *thermodynamics may be voiced, clear clarification of the meaning of signal and noise in the*
223 *climate context would be of value.*

224

225 *In short: it would be useful to clarify how "natural variability" and "internal variability"*
226 *might be isolated in the case of a complicated, nonlinear, evolving planetary system.*

227 *How are we to make sense of the traditional notions of “signal” and “noise” given that*
228 *the “noise” is not mere observational noise but actually a component of the system*
229 *dynamics, and given that in nonlinear systems we cannot appeal to a principle of*
230 *superposition of solutions (Smith, 2002).*

231
232 The modeling of climate data by stochastic climate models have been described in Mudelsee
233 (2014, sections 2.5.1 and 2.6). He describes the suitability of climate modeling with AR(1)
234 processes (and the more general ARIMA models as well) to describe the persistence in data.

235
236 The reviewer is right that correlated noise is not the same as climate variability arising from
237 nonlinear systems. However, statistical modeling has proven fruitful in a wide field of
238 ecological modeling. To stick to the modeling of global mean temperatures, we refer to our
239 review of (statistical) trend analyses in the peer-reviewed literature in the Supplementary
240 Material section of our manuscript (table S.1). Furthermore, Visser et al. (2015) show in their
241 table 1 that researchers in the field of sea level rise apply 30 trend methods for quantifying
242 "the signal" in sea level data, all with different mathematical formulations.

243
244 Note: we do not use trend models for **prediction**. Next to that, projections up to the year 2100
245 will be removed.

246
247 *It is also worth noting that the statistics community and the physical science community*
248 *often hold very different notions of what a trend is: for the first, it is a statistically consistent*
249 *combination of two well-defined models (the trend model and the noise model), while for the*
250 *second it is merely a systematic, often obvious drift. Statisticians require, and quantify,*
251 *consistency between these two components, and reject identification of a trend if that*
252 *consistency is lacking. Physical scientists often require the observations to look trendy, and*
253 *the ability to reject simple statistical models given the data, when those models are known by*
254 *construction not to admit a trend. The second bar is much lower.*

255
256 *The claim that modelling groups “have not been very successful in tuning to the observed*
257 *trend” (299) suggests some knowledge as to how large the spread would be in*
258 *the absence of each group knowing the observed trend (aiming for the same target).*
259 *It has been argued elsewhere that knowledge of such spread would be very useful to*
260 *have if, perhaps, impractical to obtain.*

261
262 *Visser et al (2017) state that “mean progression derived from GCM-based GMTs appear*
263 *to lie within the range of the trend-dataset combinations” (311). It would be interesting*
264 *to see the variations among individual CMIP5 simulations (not the mean over*
265 *them, but their distribution). The IPCC AR5 reports that variations in the global mean*
266 *temperature of today’s CMIP5 GCMs have a range exceeding 2.5 degrees (see right*
267 *side axis labels of Figure 9-08 of Flato et al (2013)); what are the implications of our*
268 *best models showing a range of GMT almost twice the 1.5 degree target? Physical*
269 *and biological processes are driven by actual temperature, not anomalies. Given the*
270 *current (limited) level of realism in these models, and the fact there is a great deal more*
271 *in them than their basis in physical understanding, the authors might wish to reconsider*
272 *calling today’s GCMs “fully physics-based” (86).*

273
274 The upper panel of figure 4 shows in part what the reviewer asks for. We will discuss the
275 implication of the wide range of incremental values at the end of the discussion section. Here,
276 we will argue that GCM simulations are less suited for tracking the signal in GMTs due to

277 their wide range. Another argument will be that GCM simulations in CMIP5 are up to date up
278 to the year 2005. Estimates for the period 2006-2016 are less reliable.

279
280 We propose to add the important comment of the reviewer that GCMs give a wide range of
281 estimates for the global temperature over the period 1961-1990. Not as anomalies but in
282 **absolute temperatures**. Indeed, figure 9.8 of the AR5 WGI report (2013, page 768) shows a
283 range from 12.6 °C to 15.3 °C, based on 36 models. This range is almost the double of the
284 1.5 °C limit.. Also see figure 1 upper panel in Hawkins and Sutton 2016 BAMS 963-980.

285
286 Finally, we propose to remove the expression that GCMs are 'fully physics based'. That is,
287 indeed, not true.

288
289 *Lastly: what precisely does it mean to hold GMT “well below” (14) some temperature*
290 *threshold? How would we know if we had missed this target? Can this be phased*
291 *with sufficient precision to allow, say, an insurance contract or legal wager to hinge on its*
292 *occurrence? Issues include the duration for which the threshold is exceeded (An*
293 *instant? A month? A year? A decade?) and how to deal with the imprecision in measuring*
294 *the global mean temperature, even today. In practice, simply setting the target*
295 *as an absolute value of GMT, inspired by the agreed 1.5 change, would prove more*
296 *straightforward both scientifically and legally, even if not politically or diplomatically.*

297
298 Good point. However, we propose to remove Section 5.2 where we extend the historical
299 analysis to the year 2100. Therefore, this important comment is not directly applicable to our
300 revised text.

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302

303 **Additional changes to a revised manuscript**

304
305 Due to the comments given by the reviewers we propose to restyle the discussion section to
306 improve readability. The following items are addressed (in this order):

- 307
- 308 • Data products, trend models and GCM simulations. Would the results presented here,
309 change if (i) other data products would have been chosen (such as JMA), (ii) other
310 trend models should have been chosen, or (iii) other GCM simulations would have
311 been chosen (such as blended simulations)?
 - 312 • Correcting for forced and unforced natural variability. This is a new item which
313 addresses the question if we should filter a GMT series for short term natural
314 variability, complying with the IPCC definition of climate change, or that we should
315 filter GMTs for all natural forcings, complying with the definition of climate change
316 of UNFCCC.
 - 317 • Choosing a pre-industrial baseline. Addresses the consequences of results presented by
318 Hawkins et al. (2017) and Schurer et al. (2017).
 - 319 • Policy recommendation. This is a the slightly extended text taken from Section 5.2.

320
321 Furthermore, we remove section 5.2.

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